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ABSTRACT
This research focuses on analyzing various aspects of firm learning in the context of
submitting bids for federally-owned, offshore wildcat tracts located in the Gulf of Mexico
that were sold in Bureau of Ocean Energy Management auctions administered between
1984 and 2015. The first chapter presents an introduction that describes the background
and institutional information relevant to the analyses contained in this dissertation. The
second chapter analyzes the relationship between bidding performance and different types
of bidding experience. The third analysis addresses the question of whether print serves as
a transmission mechanism of auction theory knowledge. The final chapter investigates the
relationship between within-area bidding experience and the uncertainty surrounding the
quantity of extractable oil and gas associated with a specific, within-area wildcat tract.
The results suggest weak evidence that firms, on average, improve their ability to bid
as they acquire an additional unit of within-area experience. No discernible evidence that
experience overall affects a firms’ ability to bid. It would be comforting to find evidence that
the uncertainty faced by firms regarding the G&G characteristics of a tract is decreasing in
within-area experience. This finding would offer an explanation for the seeming improvement
in bidding performance in within-area experience. However, the findings generated from the
final analysis suggest that the uncertainty regarding the G&G characteristics associated
with a tract does not decrease in collective, within-area experience, but rather increase, if
G&G uncertainty is measured by bid dispersion. A reasonable explanation for why this is
observed in the data is that firms are acquiring applicable knowledge of auction theory by
consuming print on the subject. In addition, the acquisition of within-area experience is
likely to result in less uncertainty regarding aspects of the auction environment that are
relevant to constructing bidding strategy. An example of this is the idea that firms gain
familiarity with aspects of the competition in terms of numbers and identities.
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The analyses included in this dissertation focus on characterizing the relationship be-
tween firm behavior and experience under a first-price, sealed-bid auction mechanism when
the value of the good is initially uncertain, but constant across any bidder that submits the
highest bid. Auction mechanisms serve as particularly convenient frameworks for analyzing
firm behavior, given their rigid prescription of rules defining the process by which the good
is exchanged. This structure, coupled with assumptions regarding bidder information struc-
tures and competition levels, provide the basis that enables modelers to formulate predictions
about the bidding behavior of rational, profit-maximizing firms. The federal offshore oil and
gas leasing program administered by the BOEM employs a first-price, sealed-bid auction
mechanism to facilitate the transfer of O&G development rights from the federal govern-
ment to the private sector. Data generated from such auction sales conducted since the
program’s inception in 1954 is extensive and available to the public. Several influential pa-
pers in applied auction theory generated their results using the BOEM auction data. The
analyses included here are applied to firms that participated in BOEM auction sales from
1984-2015. The results generated from the following analyses indicate that firms potentially
improve their ability to bid by accumulating various types of firm experience. The experience
effects are mitigated in magnitude and statistical significance when unobserved heterogeneity
across firms is adjusted for by the inclusion of a firm-level fixed effect. The results suggest
that within-area experience does not reduce the uncertainty associated with G&G charac-
teristics of a tract, which contradicts initial predictions. Finally, there is evidence that print
serves as a transmission mechanism of auction theory knowledge.
Firms acquire the right to develop oil and gas deposits associated with publicly-owned,
offshore tracts in the Gulf of Mexico by participating in auction sales where specific tracts
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are offered for sale. The federal government typically administers a couple of auctions every
year and to date there have been scores of such sales. The auction format is first-price,
sealed-bid whereby each potential bidder has the option to submit a sealed bid for any of
the tracts offered by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management during that sale. The firm
that submits the highest bid for a tract wins the right to develop oil and gas deposits within
the geographic boundaries of that tract for a specific period of time as defined by the terms
of the lease. Auction sales differ by date, areas where the nominated tracts are located,
whether any drilling has occurred on the nominated tracts in the past, and whether the
tracts are situated within close proximity to other tracts with producing potential. The
BOEM defines three types of oil and gas tracts offered for sale; wildcat, drainage, and de-
velopment. Wildcat tracts refer to those tracts that have not been drilled on and that are
not located within close proximity to either a past- or currently-producing well. Wildcat
tracts are not confirmed to have a productive O&G reservoir and are expected to be non-
commercial. Consequently, submitting a bid for a wildcat tract is perceived to be a high risk,
high reward endeavor. Historically, the vast majority of tracts offered during O&G auction
sales administered by BOEM have been for wildcat tracts. Drainage tracts are adjacent to
tracts that are interpreted to have a reservoir that is either currently being extracted by
an operable well or that could be extracted by a currently non-operating well if that well
were to become operative. In this case, the reservoir is interpreted to extend to the tract
of consideration. Development tracts are tracts adjacent to currently-operating or existing,
but not currently-operating wells. It is not guaranteed that the reservoir from which the
nearby wells potentially produce from extends to the tract of interest.
This research focuses exclusively on federally-owned, offshore wildcat tracts located in
the Gulf of Mexico that were sold in BOEM auctions administered between 1984 and 2015.
The research questions guiding each of the three analyses are:
1. What is the relationship between bidding performance and various aspects of bidding
experience?
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2. Does print serve as a transmission mechanism of auction theory knowledge?
3. Does within-area bidding experience reduce the uncertainty about the quantity of
extractable oil and gas associated with a given wildcat tract?
The first chapter fits with the learning-by-doing literature. Chapters Two and Three
consider contextual learning mechanisms. All chapters are applied to firms that submitted
bids for oil and gas development rights on federally-owned, offshore tracts in the GOM
between 1984 and 2015. The results of the analyses are intended to serve as inferences
for those firms submitting bids for O&G development rights in the future within the GOM
regions as wells as the other BOEM regions. Figure 1.1 presents a map of the BOEM regions.
The following motivating excerpt is from a paper published in the Journal of Petroleum
Technology, written by Capen et al. (1971). The authors were petroleum engineers that were
intimately involved in bidding for oil and gas development rights on offshore tracts in the
GOM prior to the paper’s publication.
“We would like to share our thoughts with you on the theory of competitive bidding. It is
a tough business. We are not sure we understand as much as we ought to about the subject.
As in most scientific endeavors, we think there is more knowledge to be gained by talking
with others than by keeping quiet.”
Their paper suggests that the “winner’s curse” was the likely culprit that resulted in lower
than expected returns during much of the federal leasing program’s history. Their work is
considered a primary attempt at formally investigating the existence of the “winner’s curse”,
which refers to the adverse selection problem resulting from the situation when bidders fail
to take into account the implication of the bad news of winning an auction. Failing to
account for the winning outcome results in lower returns than are expected if bidders consider
and act on the implication of submitting the highest bid. Bidders that take into account
the implication of submitting a winning bid, shave their bids more than they otherwise
would. This research investigates and attempts to quantify the relationship between bidding
experience and bidding performance.
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The answers to these research questions are important for the following reasons. First,
the nature of the relationship between bidding performance and various types of experience
is of value because if it is the case that specific types of experience have more or less of
an affect on bidding performance relative to other forms, then firms stand to gain by accu-
mulating such forms of experience. At the minimum, firms are at least as well off if they
map into their profit-maximizing strategy, the likely effects that different forms of experience
have on bidding performance. Insight regarding whether or not print found in books acts
as a transmission mechanism of auction theory knowledge is of interest because it provides
us with an understanding of how firms might acquire and act on information relevant to
bidding strategy. The answer to this question is important to humanity in general. An
understanding of the relationship between within-area experience and the uncertainty sur-
rounding the quantity of extractable O&G associated with a specific tract is of value because
the expected value of participating in an auction is decreasing in the uncertainty regarding
the G&G characteristics of the tract.
The remainder of this section begins with an overview of the relevant literature, followed
by a presentation of the relevant background and institutional information. The introduction
concludes with a description of the data sources used in the analyses and the cutting edge
techniques employed to acquire, process, and track the data from raw to analytic form.
1.1 Literature Review
The notion that experience performing an activity results in an enhanced ability to profi-
ciently perform that activity has existed for centuries. Wright (1936) was the first to formally
identify the relationship between experience and efficiency by plotting cumulative production
quantities against labor requirements associated with the U.S. Military’s production of air
frames at various facilities. The literature includes several studies that attempt to measure
aspects of the relationship between experience and efficiency in a variety of contexts includ-
ing wartime shipbuilding Argote et al. (1990), machine tools Hirsch (1956), nuclear power
plants Zimmerman (1982), and oil production Thornton & Thompson (2001).
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Wright (1936) illustrated the relationship between the ratio of labor to raw materials
required to produce an airplane and the quantity of production. He speculates that the
observed inverse relationship is due in part to increased labor proficiency and standardization
of the manufacturing process. He was the first to formalize the relationship between required
labor and quantity, Ȳ = aXb. Alchian (1963) analyzes the legitimacy and reliability of a
linear, log-log relationship between labor and quantity produced as a tool for estimating labor
requirements associated with varying levels of cumulative production. He concludes that the
relationship does exist, but that the affect quantity has on labor requirements differs across
aircraft models. Asher (1956) performed a similar analysis, but claimed that the commonly
accepted linear learning curve is convex for high levels of output. Hirsch (1956) calculated
the percentage decline of labor associated with a doubling of production for eight machine
tools and the mean of these “progress ratios” to be 19.3% and suggests that progress ratios
average 19-20% in many industries. He also notes firms with more experience are likely to
realize more favorable progress ratios as opposed to their less experienced competitors.
Arrow (1971) presents a model of learning and measures experience by cumulative gross
investment, suggesting the introduction of new machines alters the production environment
and serves as new stimuli for learning. Zimmerman (1982) finds evidence that learning occurs
in the construction on nuclear power plants. He also shines light on the externality associated
with a firm’s construction of a nuclear reactor plant. The idea is that other firms are able to
observe the actions of the firm constructing a plant and are able to map that knowledge into
their own ability to construct a plant. Spence (1981) presents a dynamic model of competitive
interaction in the presence of a learning curve. McCabe (1996) considered design variation,
cost uncertainty, and cost-plus contracting within a principal-agent learning model applied to
the design and construction of steam-electric power plants. His results suggest that learning
is compromised as an agent contracts with additional principals and learning is retarded by
construction cost uncertainties. Argote et al. (1990) analyze the persistence and transfer
of learning in the construction of ships during World War II. Their results suggest that
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learning depreciates rapidly and that ship yards beginning production subsequent to others
perform better. Benkard (2000) analyzes data from Lockeed’s production of L-1011 during
the period 1970-1984 and highlights the importance of organizational forgetting. Thornton
and Thompson (2001) study firm-level learning and learning spillovers associated with the
production of ships during World War II. Kellogg (2011) finds evidence that relationship-
specific learning occurs between a producer and driller as they contract with one another
over time.
The necessity to learn about the nature of strategic interaction in the context of bidding
for offshore development rights stems from the relaxation of the private values assumption
consistent with the baseline auction model that results in the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
Vickrey (1961). The absence of the private values assumption results in the phenomenon
referred to as the “winner’s curse”, which refers to irrational bidders not accounting for the
information that is embodied in winning the auction. If bidders are irrational in this sense,
then the expected value of auction participation is less than optimal, quite possibly negative.
As the excerpt in the introduction alludes to, this lack of awareness had those bidding on
tracts in the GOM puzzled.
1.1.1 Experimental Evidence
An extensive collection of studies in the realm of experimental economics document our
efforts in understanding the relationship between bidding performance and experience in
common value auctions. Garvin & Kagel (1994), using data mining techniques data from
two laboratory experiments, note that bidding experience enhances a firm’s ability to bid
and present two possible mechanisms that facilitate this relationship. The first plausible
mechanism focuses on the market selection in each subsequent period and suggests that those
firms engaged in bidding strategies that were relatively more aggressive compared to those
of other bidders were likely to experience excessive losses and consequently not participate in
future auctions. If this were the case, then the bidder behavior would be more consistent in
time as those firms exhibiting reckless bidding behavior would fall victim to bankruptcy and
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be weeded out of the market. Their second proposed mechanism accommodates learning from
both an experiential and observational perspective. The intuition behind the experiential
component is that firms that participated in prior auctions and lost money will shave their
bids more in future auctions. The observational component indicates firms that would have
lost money had they bid according to the winner’s bidding signal bid less in future auctions.
It is important to describe the design of the experiment from which they generate their
results to make comparisons with the auction environment from which the results included
from this analysis are generated. The subjects were given the option to participate in
sequential first-price, sealed bid auctions for a good of uncertain value. In each auction
the true value of the good was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with known
upper and lower bounds. In each period, each bidder was provided with a private signal that
was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with upper and lower bounds as the true
value plus epsilon and the true value less epsilon. The number of bidders, the upper and
lower bounds of the uniform distribution from which the true value of the good was drawn
from, and epsilon were common knowledge, which can be used to calculate the upper and
lower bounds of the good’s true value each period. These values were calculated and were
provided to each of the bidders along with their private signal prior to submitting a bid in
each period. The bidders were told that the mean of the difference between the value of the
item and their private signal would approximate zero if the bidder participated in a large
number of auctions, implying that on average the mean of the signal is equal to the true
value, sometimes greater than and sometimes less than. Bidders were endowed with an initial
monetary balance to submit bids with. When a bidder’s balance dropped to a non-positive
value, that bidder was no longer permitted to bid and given a participation fee. Gains and
losses were added and subtracted from each bidder’s balance after each round. Bidders that
succeeded financially and maintained a positive balance were awarded their ending balance,
plus a participation fee. The measurement of a firms’ adjustment to the winner’s curse was
measured by the difference between the bidder’s private signal and their bid, normalized for
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the inherent uncertainty of the good’s value, epsilon.
Regressions were performed using the change in the difference between signal and bid,
normalized for uncertainty, as the dependent variable and measures of various experiences
and observations as independent variables. The inclusion of various experiences isolates
different aspects of experiential learning. Three examples of experience variables are actual
gains, actual losses, and money left on the table or the difference between the winning and
second highest bid. The intuition here is the outcomes of previous auctions in terms of
monetary gains should affect bidding strategies in future auctions. Other information that
is observational in nature result from the results from those auctions that the firm did not
win. An example of this considers “what would have happened” had their signal been the
highest by applying that firm’s bid/signal deviation ratio, adjusted for uncertainty, to the
winning bidder’s private signal and calculating the monetary outcome. Subject fixed-effect
models were also included to control for unobserved heterogeneity across bidders.
The results of their findings suggest that bidding experience does enhance a bidder’s
ability to bid. Evidence of this is presented by the reduction in the frequency of bids
exceeding the bidder’s expectation of the true value of the good conditional on their signal
being the highest among all bidders. Obviously firms that submit bid levels that exceed their
expectation of the good’s value under the assumption that their signal is the most optimistic
among all participating bidders stand to lose money. The degree to which winning bidders
shaved their bids relative to their private signal was magnified with experience. There is also
evidence of a self-selection effect whereby those that perform poorly do not return for future
auction sessions relative to those that experienced success in previous auction settings. The
idea here is that those bidders that are lousy bidders experience losses due to their poor
performance and consequently are less likely to return to future sessions, resulting in a
collection of better bidders over time. The results indicate that bidders are more responsive
in terms of deviating their bid from their signal when experiencing a loss in the previous
auction relative to experiencing a gain. Money left on the table, or the difference between
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the winning and second highest bid was small and not statistically significant.
The assumptions held in the analyses performed in this research regarding the origin of
private signals to each bidder and its central tendency in relation to the true value of goods
being bid on is consistent with the design of this experiment. Prior to each round, bidders
were selected from the pool of auction participants by a rotation rule. This process of bidder
selection differs from the realities of the auction environment in the GOM in that bidders were
not randomly selected to participate in a specific auction, but instead self select which tracts
to bid on according to which tracts are perceived to be most valuable to their firm. Firms
might be more active during certain time periods for reasons exogenous to the model. Firms
might also focus their attention on specific areas, consequently increasing their presence in
auctions for those tracts located in that specific area. After each period, the true value of the
tract was revealed along with all bids and private signals associated with each bid. Identities
were concealed. Those that did not participate in a particular auction were still privy to the
results. The data used to generate the results in this paper do not include private signals for
each bidder. Other similarities between the experimental design and the analyses included
in this paper are found in the fact that bid values in both cases are observed after all bids
have been submitted. In the following analyses, the bidder identities are also available to all.
A critical difference between the auction design and the realities of the GOM environment is
that O&G firms are not able to observe the private values of individual bidders or the true
value of the tract until much later into the future after the tract has been fully developed
and all cash flows have been adjusted for time. The implication of this is that the outcome
of the previous auction is unknown for quite some time, which prevents firms from adjusting
to their success in previous bidding. If it is assumed that firms ascertain an approximation
of the true value of a tract from early production flows, then firms would have an inkling
of their bid performance on that tract, which would be used as an input into the bidding
strategy for future auctions.
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1.1.2 Previous Analyses of Bidding for Oil and Gas Development Rights in the
Gulf of Mexico
The federal government has made publicly available a plethora of data generated from
O&G development rights auctions administered by the BOEM for tracts in the GOM region.
These data have been used in a large number of peer-reviewed publications, several of which
are focused on questions related to the nature by which bidding strategies employed by firms
evolve over time in terms of bid levels, tract selection, and frequency of participation among
other interesting aspects of the implications of firms interacting in an auction environment.
Haile et al. (2010) provides an excellent overview of descriptive statistics related to auctions
over the duration of the leasing program and how they have evolved over time in response
to substantial changes in the auction environment. This paper is discussed in a following
section that discusses important trends and events. Lohrenz et al. (1983) find that the
dispersion of bids on O&G leases from 1954-1982 to be relatively large and consistent over
time, contradicting the logical expectation that technological advancements in analyzing
G&G characteristics of an area should result in converging bids. Hendricks et al. (2003)
develop a procedure to test if firms bid rationally under the assumption of common values
using auction data from auctions in the GOM. They applied their tests to a subset of the
data that included the period 1954-1970 and found that bidding behavior to be relatively
consistent with a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium under a common values information structure,
assuming firm symmetry. For competitive tracts, their results indicate that firms are aware
of the winner’s curse and adjust bids in response to changes in the number of bidders. On
less competitive tracts, the comparative static result is not as strong due to overestimation
of tract values. Their results are based on a measure of potential competition determined
by the number of bidders that submitted a bid within that specific area. The assumption
that any potential bidder that wins the item will realize a true value that is identical to the
value received by any other bidder submitting a winning bid is widely employed in studies
related to auction theory that are applied to bidding data in the GOM. The literature does
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include work, Laffont & Vuong (1996), that assume affiliated values, which can be thought
to be a hybrid of the private and common value paradigms.
1.2 Background and Institutional Information
The Outer Continental Shelf refers to the submerged areas off the shores of the United
States. Federal jurisdiction, in most cases, begins three nautical miles from the shoreline and
extends 200 nautical miles. Notable exceptions include boundaries off the shores of Texas
and Florida’s Gulf of Mexico coastline, which begin at approximately nine nautical miles
from the shoreline. The OCS Lands Act 1953 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
issue leases for the right to develop mineral resources located within the OCS that fall under
federal jurisdiction. The Act mandates that the development rights are to be transferred
in a timely manner subject to both environmental and market constraints. The Federal Oil
& Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982 established the Minerals Management Service as
the managing body of the mineral resources located within the outer continental shelf. In
2010 the DOI replaced the MMS with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement. In 2011, Secretary Ken Salazar restructured BOEMRE according to the
following functions: revenue collection, mineral resource management, and regulation and
enforcement. The three separate entities responsible for carrying out these responsibilities
are the Office of Natural Resources, BOEM, and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement, respectively. Since the restructuring, BOEM’s management roles include plan
administration, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis, economic analysis,
environmental analysis, resource evaluation and leasing. As of March 2016, there were
approximately 26 million leased acres within the OCS accounting for 16 percent of domestic
oil production and five percent of domestic gas production.
Oil and Gas Development Right Leasing Process Section 18 of the OCS Land Act man-
dates the Secretary of the Interior to develop a Five Year Program that consists of a schedule
of which areas will be available for sale and the likely timing of sale associated with each
area. Within areas are geographic polygons defined by the lines connecting a set of points
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described in terms of latitude and longitude coordinates. These polygons are referred to as
blocks and are typically nine square miles. The schedule included in the Five Year Program
is designed to maximize the expected revenue associated with development, subject to meet-
ing national energy needs and predetermined environmental standards. The finalization of
a Five Year Program prohibits the inclusion of any additional lease sales without an act of
Congress. The development of a Five Year Program typically spans the course of two and a
half years.
Figure 1.1: BOEM Regions. BOEM (2017b)
1.2.1 Leasing, Exploration, and Development Process
Lease sales facilitate the transfer of development rights associated with areas included
in an adopted Five Year Program. Lease sales follow an extensive process initiated by the
BOEM’s Call for Information and Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement in the Federal Register. The Call for Information is an announcement that the
BOEM is requesting industry to nominate those blocks that are of potential interest. During
this time the public is welcome to submit concerns regarding which blocks should not be
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available for sale. The BOEM considers the information received in response to the Call for
Information and defines a sale area accordingly. This step of the process is referred to as
area identification. A Draft EIS is in then performed on the identified area and following
its release is a 45 day period when stakeholders are invited to voice their concerns with
the proposed sale of a specific set of blocks included in the identified area. Following the
comment period is the issuance of the Final EIS, which is followed by a 30-day comment
period. The next step in the process is referred to as a Proposed Notice of Sale, which is
the first public document listing the blocks that will be available for sale and the date when
the sale is to occur. A consistency determination is conducted to ensure that the proposed
sale is consistent with individual state coastal zone policies. The Final Notice of Sale that
includes the terms and conditions of the sale is published in the Federal Register 30 days
prior to the sale. Once the Final NOS has been published in the Federal Register for 30
days, qualified bidders are invited to submit sealed bids, plus one fifth of the bonus payment
on any of the blocks included in the Final NOS. The bids are then opened publicly at a
predetermined time and location under the supervision of the director of the BOEM Region
where the tract is located. The BOEM reserves the right to reject any bid and accepts or
rejects all bids within a 90-day period. The bidding results associated with each sale are
reviewed by the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission to ensure compliance
with antitrust laws. Figure 1.2 depicts the leasing, exploration and development process.
1.2.2 Geophysical and Geological Data Acquisition - basis of block valuation
Firms and BOEM map G&G data generated from seismic surveys into expected value
estimates of mineral resources located on specific tracts. The process is initiated when a firm
submits an application to BOEM’s Resource Evaluation Program for a permit to conduct
G&G data collection operations within a specific area. Typically these firms are geophysi-
cal acquisition companies that license their data to the O&G industry. BOEM then issues
permits for the acquisition of G&G data, specifying the location, timing, equipment, and
methodologies by which the surveys are to be conducted. As a condition of the permit, the
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Figure 1.2: Leasing, Exploration and Development Process. BOEM (2017c)
data acquisition company is required to supply BOEM with the results of the survey. Ac-
cording to the BOEM website, approximately 90 percent of the G&G data in their database
was acquired from G&G surveys conducted by private industry. BOEM reimburses firms for
G&G data by paying for data reproduction costs, which is essentially zilch. BOEM does not
release geophysical data for 25 years due to its proprietary nature. Raw data is maintained
for 50 years.
1.2.3 Trends and Events - justifications for excluding data pre-1984
Figure 1.3: Timeline of Significant Trends and Events.
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Haile et al. (2010) highlight aspects of the OCS bidding environment that have evolved
drastically since its inception in 1954 and the implications for bidding patterns. The analysis
is separated into time frames characterized by distinct breaks in aspects of the auction
environment that are relevant to this analysis. In 1975 joint bidding among the eight largest
firms active in the GOM became prohibited. This policy was in response to concerns among
regulators that joint bidding among the largest firms was compromising the competitive
environment. Hendricks & Porter (1992) tests the hypothesis that joint bidding increases
competition because the policy reduces the effective cost of participating in an auction for a
specific tract. Fringe firms that bid jointly with a large firm that has already paid the cost
of acquiring G&G data from the purchase of a seismic survey of the area are essentially free
riding on the backs of large firms. The second change came in 1983 with the introduction of
Area Wide Leasing, which was intended to spur exploration and development. The adoption
of AWL resulted in far less competition for individual blocks, given that the policy enabled
firms to submit bids on a greater number of blocks relative to previous sales. Prior to AWL,
tracts offered at an auction sale were those that were previously nominated by industry
and approved by BOEM. Under AWL, nearly all tracts were available for sale at any given
auction sale. The dimming effect on competition manifested in both lower winning bid
levels and fewer bids per block with a greater number of tracts receiving one bid. Due to
the prohibition of joint bidding among the largest firms and the introduction of AWL in
1983 and their effect on the bidding environment, data used in the following analyses are
related to leases originating post 1983. They also analyze the government’s share of the
pie using a measure of calculated rents and found the federal government’s share of the
rents resulting from the transfer and development of rights in the GOM during this period
of time to be substantial and were derived from both winning bids (bonus payments) and
royalty payments associated with production, each of similar magnitude. Figure 1.3 presents
a timeline of events significant to bidding for O&G development rights in the GOM.
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1.2.4 Technological Innovation
Haile et al. (2010) indicates that innovation during the 1960s in 3-D seismic survey
processes resulted in a drastic reduction in the cost of surveying a given area. By the mid
1990s 3-D seismic technology had been widely adopted by the industry. Lohrenz et al. (1983)
finds that bidding dispersion and technological innovation to be independent of each other,
implying that advancements in seismic survey technology do you reduce bid dispersion.
1.3 Data
The analytical data sets used in the analyses included in each subsequent chapter are de-
rived from a primary data set that consists of a set of dataframes relevant to different aspects
of OCS auction sales in the Gulf of Mexico. The main data set consists of dataframes per-
taining to leases, well production, bids, nominal oil and gas prices, and Ngrams. During the
period between 1984-2015 66 auction sales were held where a total of 44,698 bids submitted
by 464 firms. A total of 23,321 tracts were bid on across 50 areas. A literate programming
technique was employed to collect and process data, conduct analyses, and generate final
reports.
1.3.1 Literate Programming Technique
Successful scientific research is characterized by two important concepts: replication and
reproducibility. Replication can be thought of as the probability that an independent re-
searcher asking the same research question will arrive at similar results using an independent
data set and methodology. If this is the case, then the results of the original study are said
to be replicated. The more times the findings of a study are replicated, the stronger those
findings become. Reproducibility refers to the reproduction of results given a raw data set
and knowledge of each step of the analysis from raw data to final analytic results. The
economics literature is littered with examples of influential papers that are not reproducible
even by the original authors, let alone an independent researcher. These cases raise concerns
about the validity of the analyses that make up the economics literature and give critics a
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justified reason to question the quality of analyses included in the body of literature, which
is used as a foundation for future studies. The prevailing attitude among the community of
researchers that publish in peer-reviewed economics journals is that “new” is greater than
“better”. In other words, there is little incentive for pursuing replication efforts compared
to working on new research questions. The implication of this cultural norm is that the eco-
nomics literature is being built in part from a faulty foundation. The percentage of journal
article retractions was seven times greater in the bio sciences than in social sciences. Why
are retractions in peer-reviewed economics journals so rare? Is it because economists are
more diligent than their counterparts in bio sciences? Is it because the perceived implication
of publishing a faulty study in bio sciences is far greater than that of economics?
A study that is both replicable and reproducible consists of three ingredients: raw data,
the machine readable code used to perform the entire analysis, and the correct study design.
Leek & Peng (2015) draws on the analogy that problematic research that has been submitted
to a journal can be thought of as a disease to the existing body of literature. Reproducibility
then can be compared to “medication” in the sense that it enables critics an enhanced ability
to more quickly identify the sources of the problem. Reproducibility alone does not prevent
problematic studies from being submitted to journals for review. To address the root issue, a
preventative approach that filters out problematic analyses prior to entering the submission
phase is necessary.
The analyses and analytical dataframes included in this research were generated from
a literate programming technique, integrating R and LaTex, from .Rnw files. The original
version of this dissertation is reproducible and integrates R and LaTex via an R Markdown
format.
1.3.2 Data Background
The vast majority of the data used to generate the results of the statistical analyses was
collected from websites owned and operated by the U.S. government. The main data set is
best thought of as a set of dataframes related to various aspects of OCS auction sales in the
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GOM. Separate dataframes are designated for the following aspects of auction sales: leases,
production, bidding, oil and gas prices, and Ngrams.
1.3.3 Leases
Lease data was downloaded from the BOEM website as a fixed-width text file BOEM
(2017a). Each observation represents a lease for oil and gas development rights on a tract
within the OCS. Information related to each lease includes its numerical identifier, winning
bid, geographical location, terms of lease, size, royalty rate, drilling information, maximum
water depth, and other pertinent information. Leases are identified by a lease number. The
lease numbers are stripped of their leading “Gs” and leading “0s”.
1.3.4 Production
Annual files containing monthly well-level production data was downloaded from BOEM
BOEM (2017a). Production files pertaining to production occurring on or after 1996 are
in text format. These files were consolidated and processed. Production data occurring
prior to 1996 is in PDF format and was digitized and converted to comma separated values
format using optical character recognition software. These files are then consolidated with
the post-1996 production to form the production dataframe. Production is then discounted
annually at an annual rate to the point time the lease became effective.
1.3.5 Bids
Bidding data was obtained in raw form from BOEM in response to a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request. The raw data was stored on a compact disc, see Figure 1.4, and was
in scanned PDF format. Bidding data is available at BOEM (2017a). Each page of data
was manually scanned with OCR software and saved as a CSV. The digitization process
was wrought with errors that were in many cases identifiable by the human eye. Regular
expressions were used to rectify recurring errors. Font usage varied by auction sale in many
cases, introducing new errors. Bidding data pertaining to individual auction sales were then
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consolidated into a bidding dataframe where each observation is an individual bid or partial
bid on a specific tract. Each observation includes a numerical identifier for each company, bid
percentage, area, group number as well as other information pertaining to bidding. There
are 44,698 bids on 23,321 tracts located on 50 areas. Bids were submitted by 464 distinct
firms.
Figure 1.4: Compact disc provided by BOEM consisting of all bid data. BOEM (2017a)
1.3.6 Oil & Gas Prices
Nominal monthly oil and gas prices were obtained from the Energy Information Admin-
istration EIA (2017). Oil prices represent monthly price per barrel in Cushing, OK. Natural
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gas prices represent monthly natural gas prices per thousand cubic feet (mcf). Nominal
prices are used as opposed to real prices because the monthly oil and gas production are
discounted annually at five % back to the date the lease became effective. The sum of dis-
counted oil and gas production for a specific tract are multiplied by the nominal price at
the date the lease became effective, yielding oil and gas revenues in discounted to the lease
effective date.
1.3.7 Drilling Costs
Drilling costs vary substantially across a multitude of dimensions. Technological innova-
tions in many instances results in lower drilling costs given a specific set of G&G characteris-
tics. Drilling costs are, on average, increasing in the depth of the water at the location where
the well is to be situated. The number of platforms located within close proximity is also
a factor that in most cases has a significant affect on drilling costs. The quality of seismic
survey results have a significant affect on a firm’s decision about various aspects of bidding
decisions, including which tracts to submit bids for and when and where to conduct ex-
ploratory drilling operations and subsequent development in terms of drilling wells. Drilling
costs in this analysis are assumed be ✩30 million in 2017 dollars. This value is discounted
annually and multiplied by the total number of wells drilled on the lease.
1.3.8 Matching Between Data frames
The leases and production dataframes are identified by lease numbers and are easily
matched post processing by lease numbers (i.e. removing leading “Gs” and “0s”). Success-
fully matching a vector of bids for development rights on a specific tract requires additional
diligence. The key is to determine which identifiers included in the dataframes containing
the bids that can be correctly matched with lease numbers included in the production and
leases dataframes and how to properly modify them so as to successfully match up. Potential
sources of error potentially stem from the OCR process. For example, the OCR software
might interpret the number zero as the letter “O”. If such an error is not addressed and
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corrected for then those bids associated with a tract would not be matched with the lease and
production data, effectively dropping an observation. Due diligence and effective utilization
of regular expressions facilitated accurate matching.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIDDING PERFORMANCE AND
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF BIDDING EXPERIENCE?
Firms acquire oil and gas development rights for offshore tracts in the Gulf of Mexico by
submitting the highest bid for a specific tract in a first-price, sealed-bid auction conducted by
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Mangagement. It is plausible that firms enhance their ability to
bid as they acquire bidding experience. An interesting question revolves around what exactly
an optimal bid level is, which is enormously challenging to ascertain under the assumption
that firms are learning to bid. This analysis proposes two measures of bidding performance
and evaluates their relationship with various types of experience. The results suggest that
there is a positive relationship between bidding performance and within-area experience. The
regression results suggest that, on average, an additional within-area bid increases rent per
dollar bid by between ✩.02 and ✩.076. The coefficient on within-area experience maintains
positive direction, but loses statistical significance in those specifications that include an
area fixed effect. Overall experience does not seem to affect bidding performance.
2.1 Data
The analytical data set used to derive the results for this analysis consists of all winning
bids submitted for O&G development rights situated on federally-owned, offshore tracts in
the Gulf of Mexico from 1984 to 2015. There are 29,809 winning bids in total. Bids submitted
by individual firms as part of a joint arrangement are counted separately as individual bids.
Bids were submitted by 429 firms for 22,748 tracts located in 44 areas. In total there were
63 relevant auction sales administered by the BOEM for tracts located in the GOM during
this period of time. Many firms included in the data set have multiple subsidiaries, which
are likely to share information relevant to the success in bidding for O&G development
rights. As a result, firms that share a common name (i.e. Conoco Exploration and Conoco
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Production) are consolidated and considered one firm. Associated with each bid are company
identification and other characteristics of the tract being bid on that are potentially relevant
to bid performance. The observables include maximum water depth, number of competitors,
number of wells, and number of platforms located within close proximity of the tract. Drilling
costs are assumed to be be ✩30 million 2017 dollars per well. The average water depth across
the sample of tracts is 2,601 feet with the deepest water being 11,159 feet. The number
of competitors can affect the expected outcome of participating in an auction. The effect
is, on average, more severe in the number of bidders that fall prey to the adverse selection
problem presented under common values. The average number of competitors bidding on
a tract is 2.30 with a maximum of 25 bidders. The number of wells drilled directly affects
drilling costs. The platform count is important as platforms are required for offshore drilling
and transporting a platform is costly. The number of platforms within close proximity are
left out of regression specifications because only a small fraction of the observations include
platform data. The mean winning bid is approximately ✩1,504,501 with a standard deviation
of ✩5,408,700. Mean real firm rents are -✩165,312 with a standard deviation of ✩16,393,195.
The mean of rent return is -1.88 with a standard deviation of 87. The analytical dataframe
is characterized as an unbalanced panel in the sense that not all of the firms included in the
sample submitted bids in every auction sale. It is also the case that many firms submitted
more than one bid in individual auctions as most firms that purchase G&G data for a
particular area are interested in more than a single tract within the area that the study
represents. A linear time trend is included to adjust coefficient estimates for time. Table 2.1
presents measures of central tendency and dispersion.
2.2 Exploratory Analysis
The relationship of interest in this analysis is that of bidding performance and experience.
Two bidding performance measures are considered. The first measure is referred to as rent
return and is the rent per dollar bid. The second measure of bidding performance is referred
to as firm rent level, which is firm rent discounted to 1984 dollars. Experience measures are
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Figure 2.1: Scatterplot of Return vs. feo
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Figure 2.2: Scatterplot of Return vs. fea
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Table 2.1: Central Tendency and Dispersion Measures of Numeric Variables.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
disc. sum of oil (bbl) 29,809 169,612 2,327,990 0 115,859,359
disc. sum of gas (mcf) 29,809 1,107,532 7,129,000 0 232,218,783
disc. oil revenues 29,809 3,566,037 45,189,062 0 2,007,842,683
disc. gas revenues 29,809 2,657,141 17,405,902 0 608,413,211
winning bid 29,809 1,504,501 5,408,700 51 204,998,400
rent 29,809 -808,039 38,560,490 -310,424,000 1,391,099,152
rent return 29,809 -1.880 87 -1,963 5,027
real firm rent 29,809 -165,312 16,393,195 -223,922,936 981,147,069
firm exp. overall 29,809 437 541 1 2,916
firm exp. in area 29,809 33 48 1 387
industry exp. overall 29,809 23,131 12,720 1 44,698
industry exp. in area 29,809 1,062 886 1 4,158
avg. group exp. 29,809 33 45 1 387
sum group exp. 29,809 64 92 1 1,361
no. of competitors 29,809 2.3 1.9 1 25
water depth 29,809 2,601 2,896 4 11,159
no. of wells 29,809 0 2 0 46
presented from both the firm and industry perspective as well as within area and overall.
Each experience measure is denominated in bids. Scatter plots of rent return and each firm
level experience measure are presented in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. Scatter plots included
in Appendix A provide a visual perspective of the relationship between each bidding per-
formance measure and each industry experience measure. Also included in Appendix A are
scatter plots of real firm rent and each measure of experience. A line of best fit is included
in each of the scatter plots. The plots do not suggest a definitive linear relationship between
either of the bidding performance measures and any of the experience measures. The plots
do present evidence of substantial variation in the dispersion of the bidding performance
measures in experience. At the firm level, bidding performance seems to become more con-
sistent as experience, both overall and within area, accumulates. This is indicated by the
seeming convergence of bidding performance measures as firm experience increases. This
pattern is visually evident across both measures of firm bidding performance. Variation in
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the dispersion of bidding performance measures as within-area industry experience increases
suggests the potential existence of within-area industry knowledge spillover. As industry
experience accumulates in an area, the dispersion of bidding performance decreases as illus-
trated in Figure A.3 and Figure A.4. Bidding performance and industry experience overall
suggest that the dispersion of bidding performance was substantially large during two dis-
tinct periods of time. This is likely due to the strong correlation between industry bidding
experience and time. A potential explanation of this is that tracts offered within specific
subsets of time could be associated with greater uncertainty.
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 present histograms of both bidding performance measures and
provide general indication about their distribution. Both histograms suggest that submitting
a winning bid for an offshore tract in the GOM is a high risk, high reward endeavor. The
vast majority of tracts that were sold between 1984 - 2015 yielded negative rents and failed
to generate any production. The gist is that most tracts that were sold were not drilled. In
such cases, firms lose an amount equal to their portion of the winning bid.
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 consist of plots of average rent return by area and firm. The
plots suggest the likely existence of unobserved heterogeneity across both factors. The model
in this analysis, as well as the vast majority of others included in the literature that are of
similar context, rely on the the assumption that firms are symmetric, implying that on
average, firms will realize the same expected outcome from submitting a bid for oil and gas
development rights located on a tract in the GOM. It is also assumed that competitive forces
drive the expected outcome of placing a bid on a tract to a constant across all tracts. If
this were not the case, then firms would gravitate to those tracts that are relatively more
attractive, consequently driving up bid levels and reducing the return so as to be equal to
that of other tracts. The dispersion of the means of rent return across both firm and area
undermine the validity of these assumptions. Both assumptions are tested econometrically.
Figure 2.7 is a correlogram that presents the correlation between the predictor variables.
The upper right panel consists of pie charts representing the correlation between two vari-
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Rent Return
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Real Firm Rents
29
Figure 2.5: Average Rent Return By Area
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Figure 2.6: Average Rent Return By Firm
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ables. Positively correlated variables are depicted in blue and negative in red. A pie chart
three quarters filled indicates a correlation of .75. The lower panel consists of confidence
ellipses at the 95% confidence level and a line of best fit. The positive correlation between
the maximum water depth and both measures of firm experience suggest that firms with
more experience, both overall and within area, have a tendency to submit bids on tracts
located in deeper waters. While the relationship is of interest, it is hardly surprising given
the level of expertise and capital that are required to drill in deep waters. It is reasonable
to assume that expertise and access to capital are correlated with experience to some degree
as long as bidding firms are also producers. Another interesting relationship is that between
bidding activity and the number of competitors bidding on a tract. The correlation sug-
gests that firms that have been relatively more active in terms of bidding during the period
between 1984-2015 tend to bid on tracts that attract greater competition. This suggests
that more experienced bidders tend to gravitate together in terms of which tracts they bid
on. Bidding performance is also positively correlated with the maximum tract water depth.
This relationship suggests that those firms that bid on tracts in deeper water, on average,
generated larger returns relative to tracts located in shallower waters. Of course, this could
be the result of the effect that experience has on bidding performance. If indeed experience,
on average, enhances a firm’s ability to bid, then the greater returns generated from deeper
tracts might not be the result of water depth, but instead due to the idea that firms that
are better at bidding, bid in deeper water.
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Figure 2.7: Correlogram of Predictor Variables
2.3 Study Design
The intent of this analysis is to estimate the effect that an increase in bidding experience
has on bidding performance. In a hypothetical world, a researcher could revert back to a
point in time and observe a specific firm bidding on a specific tract. The researcher would
then observe that firms’ bidding performance under different levels of bidding experience,
while holding all else constant. This process would then be repeated on each tract at each
33
point in time for all firms in the sample. The objective of this section is to determine a
strategy that mimics a randomized experiment so as to mitigate selection bias.
The dataframe is characterized as an unbalanced panel, where each bidder is potentially
observed bidding multiple times per time period and across multiple time periods. Several
potential confounding factors exist that could potentially bias the estimated relationship
of interest. For instance, there may exist unobserved heterogeneity across firms that affects
bidding performance. Similarly, there may be unobserved heterogeneity across different areas
that have a significant influence on bidding performance. It may potentially be the case that
different periods of time are associated with differences that are unobserved by the researcher,
but affect bidding performance. A linear time trend is included in all specifications to adjust
the coefficient estimates of interest for time. A time fixed effect would also control for
unobserved heterogeneity across time. Introducing firm and area fixed effects attempts to
capture unobserved heterogeneity across firm and area.
A set of assumptions establishes the structure of the econometric model employed to
estimate the directional and magnitudinal effect that bidding experience has on bid per-
formance. It is assumed that firms are symmetric with regard to their ability to generate
accurate estimates of the quantity of extractable O&G associated with a given tract. It is
also assumed that firms, on average, accurately estimate the quantity of extractable O&G
associated with a particular tract. Sometimes their estimate exceeds the true value of the
tract and other times their estimate is shy of the true value. Firms are assumed to have
identical ability in extracting O&G and consequently have identical cost structures. Firms
share identical expectations about future output prices and will receive the same price per
unit produced. Drilling costs are assumed to be ✩30 million 2017 dollars per well. Compet-
itive forces are assumed to drive the expected return associated with submitting a bid on
any tract to a constant, implying that all tracts offered for sale at any given point in time
are equally attractive.
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The objective is then to estimate the effects of each type of experience on bidding perfor-
mance while controlling for time, firm and area fixed effects, and all other relevant, available
observables. Firm and area fixed effects are included to address the possibility that unob-
served heterogeneity exists within these factors. For instance, it is potentially the case that,
holding all else constant, some firms are better at bidding than other firms. A plausible ex-
ample of such a situation could arise when comparing the bidding performance of a massive
O&G firm to that of a smaller fringe firm. The large firm, assuming that it has a greater
ability to attract and hire the best strategists, might, on average, perform better than the
smaller fringe firm solely because they have the best talent. An equally plausible situation
is described by the case where a smaller fringe firm with relatively less capital puts greater
effort into each bid due to the relatively large losses that would result from submitting an
excessively high bid for a losing tract. Small firms, in this case, cannot absorb the relatively
large losses resulting from overvaluing just a handful of tracts and consequently perform
their due diligence on a smaller number of tracts. It is plausible that there exists unobserved
heterogeneity across areas due to varying geological and geophysical characteristics. The
assumptions imply that firms are symmetric in all ways except for their ability to bid, which
is expected to be increasing in experience and that the expected value of each available tract
at one point in time are equally attractive. These assumptions are tested by adding firm
and area fixed effects.
Two measures of bid performance are presented below for firm i bidding on tract b in
time t in area k. Equation 2.1 measure can be thought of as a return on investment and is
calculated by discounted revenues less royalties, drilling costs, and winning bid divided by
the winning bid. The second measure of bidding performance presented in Equation 2.2 is
a rent level measure and is calculated by scaling rent by that firm’s bid fraction. The per
firm rent levels are discounted at 5% to base year 1984. Equation 2.3 presents the general
econometric specification.
reti,b,t,k =




rrenti,b,t,k = (dri,b,t,k − royi,b,t,k − drilli,b,t,k − bidi,b,t,k) ∗ bidperi,b,t,k ∗ df84,t (2.2)
2.4 Econometric Model




kδ + ei,b,t,kβei,b,t,k +Oi,b,t,kβOi,b,t,k + ǫi,b,t,k, (2.3)
where ei,b,t,k is a matrix of experience variables measuring different types of experience. In-
cluded are measures of both firm and industry experience, overall and within area. Oi,b,t,k is
a matrix of observables that potentially affect calculated rent, including a time trend. Ex-
amples of factors that are likely to impact rent are the water depth and the number of com-
petitors. The null and alternative hypotheses are H0 : βexperience = 0 and Ha : βexperience 6= 0,
respectively. The strategy for constructing specific specifications is to begin with regressing a
rent performance measure on both overall and within area firm experience, while controlling
for time using a linear time trend. Observables that are likely to affect bidding performance
are added sequentially, beginning with industry experience overall to test for industry knowl-
edge spillover. Maximum water depth is added beginning with specification 3) as is the sum
of discounted oil beginning in specification 4), respectively. Area and firm fixed effects are
added last to test for unobserved heterogeneity across areas and firms respectively.
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 presents results generated from specifications with rent return serving as the
bidding performance measure indicating that within-area firm experience has a positive and
statistically significant effect on rent return. The coefficient estimates range between ✩.02-
✩.08, which are relatively small in magnitude relative to the mean and standard deviation
of rent return, -1.88 and 87, respectively. The direction of the relationship is robust to both
firm and area fixed effects, but statistical significance of the coefficient estimate is not robust
to area fixed effects. Firm experience overall seems to not affect bidding performance to
any substantial degree. The results derived from those specifications where real rent to the
firm serves as the dependent variable tell a similar story and are included in Table A.1 in
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Appendix A. Also included in the Appendix A are the regression results when the sample
is restricted to the top 20 most active firms, where bidding activity is measured by the
total number of bids submitted across the entire sample. The regression results generated
from the top 20 firms are very similar to the results generated from the unrestricted sample,
suggesting that the findings are robust across firms with varying levels of bidding activity.
The primary focus will be on specifications relying on rent return as the dependent variable.
Coefficients on water depth and cumulative discounted oil production are positive and statis-
tically significant across all specifications, suggesting that both of these tract characteristics
significantly influence calculated rent return. One caveat is that drilling costs are assumed
to be dependent exclusively on the number of wells drilled and not the depth. As a result,
the coefficient estimates on water depth might be biased upward. The coefficients on indus-
try experience overall are very small, but statistically significant. The coefficient estimate
for the time trend is positive and statistically significant for specifications with sufficient
controls, indicating that returns, on average, are increasing in time. The results are robust
to firm fixed effect, but lose statistical significance when an area fixed effect is included in
the specification. These results provide evidence of the existence of unobserved heterogene-
ity across areas, but support to some degree that firms, on average, are symmetric. Table
2.3 and Table 2.4 apply clustered errors around area and firm respectively. The results are
robust to both types of clustered standard errors.
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Table 2.2: Rent Return Regressed on Firm and Industry Experience
Dependent variable:
rent return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 1.264 2.522∗ 1.708 −5.789∗∗∗ −5.871∗∗ 1.476 2.957
(1.025) (1.423) (1.342) (0.695) (2.327) (4.941) (4.498)
firm exp. overall 0.0002 0.0005 −0.003∗∗ 0.0001 0.001 −0.005∗ −0.006∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
firm exp. area 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.021 0.020 0.034∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013)
time trend −0.420∗∗∗ 0.791 1.641∗∗ 1.394∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗ 1.375∗∗
(0.062) (0.617) (0.690) (0.474) (0.481) (0.567) (0.557)
ind. exp. overall −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
max water depth 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Area FE N N N N Y Y N
Firm FE N N N N N Y Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.3: Rent Return Regressed on Firm and Industry Experience
Dependent variable:
rent return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 1.264 2.522 1.708 −5.789∗∗∗ −5.871∗∗∗ 1.476 2.957
(2.891) (3.604) (2.799) (1.099) (1.502) (4.768) (4.924)
firm exp. overall 0.0002 0.0005 −0.003 0.0001 0.001 −0.005 −0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
firm exp. area 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.021 0.020 0.034∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
time trend −0.420∗∗∗ 0.791 1.641∗ 1.394∗∗ 1.473∗∗ 1.362 1.375∗
(0.098) (0.896) (0.994) (0.655) (0.667) (0.847) (0.828)
ind. exp. overall −0.001 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
max water depth 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Area FE N N N N Y Y N
Firm FE N N N N N Y Y
Area clustered SE
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Rent Return Regressed on Firm and Industry Experience
Dependent variable:
rent return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 1.264 2.522 1.708 −5.789∗∗∗ −5.871∗∗ 1.476 2.957
(1.799) (2.300) (1.961) (0.816) (2.505) (2.761) (2.761)
firm exp. overall 0.0002 0.0005 −0.003∗∗ 0.0001 0.001 −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
firm exp. area 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.021 0.020 0.034∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
time trend −0.420∗∗∗ 0.791 1.641∗ 1.394∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗ 1.375∗∗
(0.087) (0.923) (0.912) (0.545) (0.542) (0.620) (0.620)
ind. exp. overall −0.001 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
max water depth 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Area FE N N N N Y Y N
Firm FE N N N N N Y Y
Firm clustered SE
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 2.2 plots rent return vs. firm experience within area. The plot indicates that
the dispersion of rent return is decreasing in firm experience within area. Several potential
explanations exist as to why, on average, the dispersion of rent return shrinks as the win-
ning bidder acquires additional within-area experience. First, it is plausible to reason that
within-area bidding experience, on average, reduces the uncertainty faced by a bidding firm
regarding the quantity of extractable oil and gas that are associated with a tract of interest.
As the quality of information improves, the signal received by the firm that maps into the
expected value of submitting a bid on a tract becomes more certain. Given that all firms
have at least as much experience at one point in time relative to a previous point in time,
firms’ experience within a given area are correlated. Given that all firms quality of informa-
tion is weakly-monotonically increasing in time, then firms’ bidding behavior, on average,
should converge. If firms’ bidding behavior is increasing in consistency, then the dispersion
of rent return is expected to shrink as a result. It is likely that firms are the beneficiaries of
auction theory knowledge resulting from the efforts of experts translating their contributions
into a language that is printed in mass. The relationship between firm bidding consistency
and knowledge stock is explored in the subsequent chapter. The fourth chapter will test if,
on average, within-area experience reduces the uncertainty of the signal that firms acquire
regarding the value of a tract based on G&G data.
2.6 Conclusion
The results suggest a positive, but small relationship between bidding performance and
within-area experience in specifications that do not include an area fixed effect. When an
area fixed effect is included, the coefficient estimates of interest lose statistical significance,
undermining the credibility of model assumption regarding tract symmetry. The results sug-
gest the likely presence of unobserved heterogeneity across areas. Findings are similar across
different subsets of firm bidding activity and alternative measures of bidding performance.
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CHAPTER 3
DOES PRINT SERVE AS A TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF AUCTION THEORY
KNOWLEDGE?
The expected outcome to an oil and gas firm from participating in a first-price, sealed-bid
auction for offshore development rights is dependent upon that firm’s ability to perform two
tasks: 1) map seismic survey results into estimates of the volume of oil and gas associated
with a specific tract prior to conducting exploratory efforts and 2) strategically engage with
other bidders that are competing for the same prize. The first task seems quite obvious in
that, assuming common values, less uncertainty regarding the value of the object being bid
on is helpful to the potential bidder and increases the expected outcome of participating
in an auction. It is no secret that the productivity of a tract provides an indication of
the productivity potential of neighboring tracts. The second task is less obvious and more
abstract. It involves the intricacies of the interaction among firms competing for the same
resources in an auction setting. Equilibrium bid vectors consistent with the common values
paradigm can only be considered to represent an equilibrium if all firms assumed to be
involved behave rationally under the assumptions regarding the structure of information
available to the bidders. The perception that returns to investment in offshore development
rights in the Gulf of Mexico have historically been abnormally low is not new and has been
considered for decades, as alluded to by the quote cited in the introduction of this dissertation
taken from Capen et al. (1971). Much of the speculation as to why has been focused on the
“winner’s curse” phenomenon. Perhaps returns would, on average, be greater if there was
greater understanding of the mechanics of the strategic interaction governing the auctions
which facilitate the transfer of offshore O&G development rights in the GOM from the public
to the private sector. This paper presents an approach to address the question of whether
Ngrams related to common value auctions, which serve as a proxy for the relative interest
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that a collection of people has in a general topic, serve as a transmission mechanism for
auction theory knowledge.
3.1 Data
The relationship of interest in this analysis is the dispersion of bidding behavior across
firms bidding for a tract and a proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge in existence
at that point in time. If firms effectively apply auction theory knowledge to their bidding
strategy and acquire such knowledge from print related to the development of auction theory,
then one would expect bidding behavior to converge across firms in a proxy of the stock
of auction theory knowledge. This analysis proposes three approaches to measuring the
dispersion of bidding behavior across firms. The measurement that is the primary focus of
this analysis is generated from the absolute value of the residuals resulting from regressing
rent return resulting from winning bids on a proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge
while adjusting for time, available and potentially relevant observables, and firm and area
fixed effects. The intuition is that if firms acquire auction theory knowledge from print or
excitement surrounding that print, say boardroom discussions related to the topic, and map
that knowledge into their bidding strategies, then firms will employ bidding strategies of
increasing similarity as the stock of auction theory knowledge increases. Consequently, rent
returns should vary less in the proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge relevant to
bidding strategy. The second approach to measuring bid dispersion is the ratio of the second
highest bid to the winning bid. This measure has been employed in the literature to measure
bid dispersion. The third measure of bid dispersion is the standard deviation of bids for each
tract receiving at least two bids.
The dataframe that the initial regression results are generated from consists of all winning
bids, counting fractional bids resulting from joint bidding as separate entities. In total there
are 26,647 winning bids spanning the time period 1984 - 2008. Bids were submitted by
401 companies for 20,070 tracts across 43 areas. The results generated from regressing the
ratio of the second highest bid to the winning bid on the stock of auction theory knowledge
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are based on a dataframe consisting of 5,275 observations, excluding joint bids, where the
unit of observation is a tract that received at least two bids. Associated with each tract
are general measures of collective experience across all firms that submitted a bid for that
specific tract. There are 39 areas represented. The seemingly large difference in the number
of observations between the two analytical dataframes results from the treatment of joint
bids as individual bids and the fact that tracts receiving only one bid are excluded from the
second analytical dataframe. Measures of central tendency and dispersion are presented in
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.
Table 3.1: Central tendency and dispersion measures of numeric variables (winning bids with
Ngrams)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
disc. sum of oil 26,628 189,302 2,462,094 0 115,859,359
rent return 26,628 -1.71 91 -1,963 5,027
firm exp. overall 26,628 408 501 1 2,765
firm exp. in area 26,628 30 45 1 380
industry exp. overall 26,628 20,790 11,384 1 40,671
industry exp. in area 26,628 959 790 1 3,667
no. of wells 26,628 .472 1.796 0 46
time trend 26,628 12 7 0 24
avg. bid exp. in area 26,628 30 41 1 374
sum of bid exp. in area 26,628 61 89 1 1,361
auction theory 26,628 0 0 0 0
auction knowledge stock 26,628 .002 .002 0 .005
no. of bids 26,628 1.496 1.054 1 15
3.1.1 Auction Theory Knowledge Proxy
Creating a proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge poses obvious challenges.
This analysis begins by describing the nature of auction theory knowledge in terms where
it is stored, how it accumulates and how it might propagate across society or in this case
across firms interested in acquiring O&G development rights. Across time there has been a
tendency for humans to transmit their knowledge into a commonly accepted language (i.e.
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Table 3.2: Central tendency and dispersion measures of numeric variables (tracts receiving
greater than two bids)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
disc. sum of oil 5,272 244,884 2,416,509 0 82,079,292
rent return 5,272 -3.983 46 -952 1,332
firm exp. overall 5,272 431 522 1 2,751
firm exp. in area 5,272 33 48 1 380
industry exp. overall 5,272 21,887 11,370 7 40,668
industry exp. in area 5,272 1,075 853 1 3,665
no. of wells 5,272 .818 2.36 0 46
time trend 5,272 13 7 0 24
avg. bid exp. in area 5,272 30 34 1 239
sum of bid exp. in area 5,272 105 131 2 1,361
auction theory 5,272 0 0 0 0
auction knowledge stock 5,272 .002 .002 0 .005
no. of bids 5,272 2.72 1.30 2 15
bid st. dev. 5,272 1,190,978 4,153,939 30 143,464,820
bid ratio 5,272 .537 .273 .007 1
bid range 5,272 2,247,219 7,537,530 43 202,889,894
Latin or English) for others to read. Prior to the introduction of the internet, knowledge,
in many instances was transferred across people via print. In other words, knowledge is
concentrated into print for others to acquire. With innovations in printing press technology,
masses of people were able access and acquire knowledge from others by reading their work.
Consider Chinese merchants travelling the Silk Road to sell their silk to civilizations from
spanning from Asia to Europe. It is likely the case that knowledge that was at one point
known only to their people, was transferred to other parts of the world through print. How
do people in the United States learn how to cook Indian dishes? In many cases, they acquire
such knowledge through a cookbook.
Assuming that knowledge accumulates in print, how might we develop a proxy for its
measurement? Given almost any topic, surely there exists a plethora of books, articles,
websites dedicated shining light on whatever the topic of interest may be. How might
weights be constructed to weigh the relative importance of each source? In most cases, some
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sources are closer to the truth relative to other competing philosophies. Who is qualified
to judge? It is not the intent of this research to specify and place relative weights on the
importance of differing sources. The intent of this part of the analysis is to develop a proxy
for auction theory knowledge and how it accumulates across time. If a civilization is actively
seeking understanding of an arbitrary topic, chances are there are thought leaders among
that collection of people presenting their understanding of the topic by writing a book on
the subject. A book written on a subject is most likely going to include words or phrases
that are commonly associated with that topic. Consider knowledge regarding the discovery
of the Higgs boson. Print related to the such knowledge are littered with words and phrases
related to this discovery. For instance, the word combinations “Higgs boson” and “Large
Hadron Collider” are most likely used heavily in any printed work on the subject. If books
are thought to store knowledge and pieces of printed work on a particular subject contain
words or phrases that are commonly understood to be associated with that particular topic,
then it is plausible to assume that the stock of knowledge of a subject increases as more is
written about the subject. Access and analysis of all print with information regarding when
it was printed and in what language could potentially be helpful in shining light on what
topics civilizations were focused on during a specific period of time.
3.1.2 Google Ngrams Viewer
The Google Ngram Viewer is a tool that enables researchers to get a sense of what was
important to a collection of people during a period of time. The tool is based on a data set
generated from the digitization of over five million books. The project was completed by
Jon Orwant and Will Brockman at Google, but was inspired by the work of Jean-Baptiste
Michel, Erez Aiden, Yuan Shen, and Steven Pinkner Contributors (Accessed May). The text
was digitized using OCR software, which is the source of its primary criticism given that
the usage of OCR software rarely results in a perfect outcome. The Google Ngram Viewer
takes words or phases referred to as Ngrams as input and returns data on when and on what
frequency each Ngram was printed relative to other Ngrams of the same size where size is
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N. A unigram refers to one word, a bigram refers to two words where order is relevant, a
trigram refers to a sequence of three words where order is relevant and so on... The results
are normalized to adjust for differing volumes of published books across time. The key is to
correctly identify which Ngrams that are indicative of material contributing the the stock of
knowledge about the concept or idea that is of interest.
The accumulation of various Ngrams constitute a proxy for the stock of auction theory
knowledge across time. This analysis considers two types of Ngrams. The first type of Ngram
represents the identities of the individuals that publish in the most highly regarded peer-
reviewed journals that focus on auction theory topics. The second type of Ngram represents
ideas, concepts and catch phrases related to auction theory. An example of this is the
bigram “winner’s curse”. Sums of Ngrams both within and across types are also considered
as proxies for the measure of the stock of auction theory knowledge.
3.2 Exploratory Analysis
The two measures of bidding behavior consistency are plotted against the stock of auction
theory knowledge. The plots of the standard deviation against auction theory knowledge
and the plot of bid range against auction theory knowledge are included in the Appendix B.
There appears to be a subtle increase in rent return as the stock of auction theory knowl-
edge increases. Two distinct patters of the rent return vs. knowledge suggest at least two
sources of heteroscedasticity. Across the entire domain of knowledge there seems to be a
general negative relationship between the variables, suggesting that the dispersion of bid-
ding behavior decreases in the stock of auction theory knowledge. The second pattern can
be thought of as two distinct subsets of the domain of knowledge stock being associated with
high levels of bid dispersion relative to the other values of knowledge stock. The two areas of
relatively large bid dispersion are likely caused, not by changes in knowledge stock, but by
another variable that influences rent return. The plot of the absolute value of the residuals
against the stock of knowledge do not indicate an obvious relationship. Regression analysis
will provide deeper insight into the relationship. The plot of the bid ratio and knowledge
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indicates a potentially negative relationship between the stock of auction theory knowledge
and the ratio of the two highest bids. A line of best fit is used to smooth the data. The
regression line seems to indicate a negative relationship, which is opposite of the expected
result. Regression analysis will yield greater insight regarding this relationship.
Figure 3.1: Correlogram of Predictor variables
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Figure 3.2: Auction Theory Knowledge Stock Across Time
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Figure 3.3: Absolute Value of Residuals and Auction Theory Knowledge
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3.3 Econometric Model
A set of assumptions establish the structure of each econometric model used to test if print
found in books serves as a transmission mechanism of auction theory knowledge. Each of the
following models assume that firms are symmetric with regard to their ability in mapping
seismic survey results into estimates of the volume of extractable oil and gas associated with
each tract prior to submitting a bid. Firms, on average, are assumed to accurately estimate
the volume of extractable oil and gas associated with a specific tract, sometimes erring high
and other times low. Firms are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their ability to
extract oil and gas and will receive an identical price for production. Finally, competitive
forces drive expected rents for all tracts to a constant.
The primary model assumes that the dispersion of bidding behavior is measured by the
absolute value of the residuals resulting from regressing rent return on the stock of auction
theory knowledge while adjusting for time, available and relevant observables, unobserved
heterogeneity across firms and areas. It is assumed that rent return is a function of the proxy
for the stock of auction theory knowledge, overall- and within-area experience, industry
experience, time, and area and firm fixed effects. Rent return is assumed to be linear in the
coefficients and the errors are assumed to be homoscedastic.
reti,b,t,k =
dri,b,t,k − royi,b,t,k − drilli,b,t,k − bidi,b,t,k
bidi,b,t,k
(3.1)




kδ + βatkatki,b,t,k + ei,b,t,kβe +Oi,b,t,kβO + ǫi,b,t,k, (3.2)




kδ + βatkatki,b,t,k + ei,b,t,kβe +Oi,b,t,kβO + ǫi,b,t,k, (3.3)
where Fi is a vector of firm dummy variables and γ is a vector of the average deviation
from the reference firm’s average rent return holding all else constant. Ak is a vector of
area dummy variables and δ is the vector of average deviation from the reference area’s
average rent return holding all else constant. atkt is the proxy for the stock of auction
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theory knowledge at time t. The underlying intuition regarding the nature by which the
knowledge of auction theory manifests into bidding strategy can be thought of by imagining
two states of the world: one defined by bidder ignorance of auction theory and the other
defined by symmetric bidders behaving rationally under the common values paradigm. If
bidders are oblivious to auction theory, then it is plausible to expect that the dispersion of
returns to be large, given that potential bidders are not versed in identifying and mapping
relevant information into their bid strategy. In contrast, if all firms are symmetric and the
information structure is consistent with the common values paradigm, then it seems plausible
that potential bidders would behave in similar fashion, resulting in less disperse returns.
The absolute value of the residuals generated from regressing rent return on the stock
of auction theory knowledge under the assumption that the errors are homoscedastic are
regressed on the identical set of independent variables using heteroscedastic robust standard
errors. It is expected that the coefficient on the proxy for the stock of auction theory
knowledge is negative, lending evidence to the notion that, on average, increasing the proxy
for the stock of auction theory knowledge results in greater consistency in bidding behavior
across firms.
3.4 Results
Alternative measurements of the dispersion of bidding behavior yield contradictory results
when regressed on a proxy for stock of auction theory knowledge. The coefficient estimate on
the stock of auction theory knowledge when the dependent variable is the absolute value of
the residuals from regressing rent return on the stock of auction theory knowledge is negative
and statistically significant at a one percent significance level when performed using robust
standard errors as reported in Table 3.4. The results indicate that, on average, an increase
of a millionth in the proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge results in a decrease of
.02 in the deviation between the actual returns and expected returns conditional on values
for the predictor variables, which include firm and industry experience, water depth, and
discounted oil production. The coefficient estimate of interest is adjusted for time via a linear
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time trend. Given that dependent variable was generated from the initial regression, it was
necessary to bootstrap the standard errors. The results from a 5,000 iteration bootstrap is
presented in Table 3.5. To characterize the magnitude of the effect that an increase in the
proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge has on the deviation of rent return from
its predicted value, consider the minimum and maximum values of the proxy for the stock
of auction theory knowledge, which are 0 and .005, respectively. Within these bounds are
5,000 millionths. Given that the proxy for auction theory knowledge is weakly monotonically
increasing by the nature of its construct, it is helpful to imagine the proxy growing from 0
to .005 during the period 1984 to 2008. On average, each millionth increase in the proxy,
will reduce the deviation from actual rent return from its predicted value by .02. The mean
deviation is 14.78. From 1984 through 2008 we could expect a decrease of 100 = .02 ∗ 5, 000
in the difference between rent return and predicted rent return. This is substantial and
lends evidence to the notion that bidding behavior increases in consistency in increases in
the proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge.
The regression specification that generated the residual values serving as the dependent
variable in the primary specifications was performed using robust standard errors as well.
The coefficient on the stock of auction theory knowledge suggests that a millionth increase
in the stock of auction theory knowledge, on average, increases the rent return by ✩.02. The
results are included in Table 3.3. This effect is substantial over time given that the proxy for
the stock of auction theory knowledge is weakly monotonically increasing from 1984-2008.
Assuming this relationship holds across the relevant time period, rent return would increase
by 100 = 5, 000 ∗ .02.
The regression specifications employing the ratio of the second highest bid to the winning
bid as the dependent variable yield a null result. The results indicate that an increase of
a millionth in the proxy for the stock of auction theory knowledge, on average, does not
affect rent returns. The specifications that employ the standard deviation of bids as the
dependent variable yield results that are opposite of expected. The results of the final set of
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specifications suggest that a millionth increase in the stock of auction theory knowledge, on
average, increases the standard deviation of bids by approximately ✩5,225. All coefficients
on the stock of auction theory knowledge are statistically significant at the one-percent level
of significance.





knowledge stock (millionths) 0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
firm exp. overall −0.01
(0.004)








disc. oil prod. (000s) 0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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knowledge stock (millionths) −0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
firm exp. overall −0.01∗∗∗
(0.003)








disc. oil prod. (000s) 0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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knowledge stock (millionths) −0.028∗∗∗
(−0.0279, −0.0162)
firm exp. overall −0.01∗∗∗
(−0.01, −0.004)








disc. oil prod. (000s) 0.02∗∗∗
(0.02, 0.02)




Residual Std. Error 55.22 (df = 26180)
F Statistic 34.78∗∗∗ (df = 447; 26180)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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3.5 Conclusion
The results from the primary specifications suggest that an increase in the stock of
auction theory knowledge, on average, decreases the deviation from actual and predicted
values by .02. This result is statistically significant at the one-percent level of significance.
The primary specifications also indicate that a marginal increase in the stock of auction
theory knowledge, on average, results in an increase of .02 in rent return. The results
associated from the specifications using the alternative measures of the dispersion of bidding
behavior suggest that the opposite is true. The specifications with the bid ratio serving
as the dependent variable indicate that an increase in the stock of knowledge reduces the
ratio of the second highest bid to the winning bid, implying that the money left on the
table is increasing in knowledge stock, contrary to what is predicted. The specifications with
the standard deviation as the dependent variable indicate that an increase in the stock of
knowledge, on average, increase the dispersion of bids. The favored measure of bid dispersion
is the absolute value of the residuals from regressing rent return on the stock of auction theory
knowledge. Justification for focusing on the measure employed in the primary regressions is
due to the presence of noise in the data, especially among bidders that intentionally submit
bids without the expectation of winning. Past research suggests that there is strong evidence
that O&G firms have, in the past, submitted bids of such nature to disguise collusive efforts.
Consequently, it is reasonable to eliminate non-winning bids from consideration in this case.
Further justification stems from the fact that the analytical dataframe including all winning
bids and their associated returns includes five-fold more observations.
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CHAPTER 4
DOES WITHIN-AREA BIDDING EXPERIENCE REDUCE GEOPHYSICAL AND
GEOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY?
Firms acquire oil and gas development rights on offshore tracts in the Gulf of Mexico by
submitting bids for tracts in first-price, sealed-bid auctions conducted by the BOEM. The
expected outcome of submitting a bid for development rights on any given tract is presum-
ably non increasing in the uncertainty surrounding the size of extractable O&G deposits tied
to the tract. Several information sources map into firms’ expectation about the volume of
extractable O&G deposits on a specific tract. Firms typically purchase seismic survey data
for a swath of the GOM containing many tracts from firms that specialize in conducting
seismic surveys. The data is mapped into an estimate of the size of O&G deposits for each
tract. Firms observe O&G production from tracts neighboring the tract of interest. Pro-
duction flows from neighboring tracts, without a doubt, provide valuable insight regarding
the potential of other tracts within close proximity. Firm experience within a given area
in terms of previous development right acquisition efforts along with experience developing
tracts inevitably reduces the uncertainty of the volume of extractable O&G tied to other
tracts within the area. The intent of this analysis is to quantify the relationship between
uncertainty regarding the volume of O&G associated with a tract and bidders’ experience.
It is expected that uncertainty dissipates in within-area experience.
4.1 Data
The analytical dataframe consists of all tracts receiving at least two bids that were sold in
BOEM auctions from 1984-2008. There are 5,275 observations. Table 4.1 presents measures
of central tendency and dispersion. Associated with each observation are two alternative
measures of bid dispersion and two measures of collective, within-area bidder experience.
The bid dispersion measures seek to measure the dispersion of bids submitted on each tract.
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Bid levels indicate information about the private signal received by firms regarding a tract’s
value. This signal is assumed to result from interpreting seismic survey data and or observing
production on neighboring tracts. Bid levels then are based on this private signal. If the
dispersion of the signal is smaller for all bidders, then it follows that bid levels, on average,
for a particular tract, would be closer together. If firms have greater certainty surrounding
the value of a tract, then they will bid in a relatively consistent manner, relative to a scenario
with greater G&G uncertainty. The primary measure of bid dispersion is the ratio of the
second high bid to the winning bid. When subtracted from 1, the measurement can be
thought of as representing the “money left on the table” as a fraction of the winning bid.
This measure has been used to measure bid dispersion in the literature and seems to be
superior to standard measures of dispersion (i.e. standard deviation). The intuition behind
this conclusion results from the all inclusive nature of the variance calculation. The variance
calculation includes all bids and consequently provides a measure of dispersion across all bids.
In this context, it is plausible to assume that there are some firms that submit extremely
low bids on many tracts in hopes of getting lucky. There is also evidence of O&G companies
colluding and submitting bids with the belief that they would be inconsequential. Consider
an instance where two oil firms are colluding by alternating who submits the winning bid
on tracts that are being bid on sequentially. The losing firm each time would submit a bid
to create the illusion of competition to regulatory authorities, with the knowledge that their
bid would not win. Including such “phantom” bids would result in a biased measure of
bid dispersion. For these reasons, it makes more sense to focus on a measure of dispersion
between the top two bids on any given tract. The standard deviation regression results are
included in Table 4.6 - Table 4.9 for completeness. The experience measures are intended
to measure the within-area experience accumulated by the bidders submitting bids on a
particular tract. The experience measures are all inclusive so as to remain consistent with
the bid dispersion calculations. Two alternative measures of experience are considered. The
first measure of bidding experience is the average number of bids previously submitted within
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that area by the firms submitting bids for that particular tract. The second measure is the
sum of bids previously submitted by firms submitting bids for that particular tract. The
average bidding experience is preferred to the sum because it is normalized for the number
of bidders.
Table 4.1: Central Tendency and Variation Measures of Numeric Variables (bid dispersion
measures)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
disc. sum of oil (bbl) 5,272 244,884.1 2,416,509.0 0.0 82,079,292.0
rent return 5,272 -4.0 46.2 -952.3 1,331.6
firm exp. overall 5,272 431.3 521.6 1 2,751
firm exp. in area 5,272 32.5 48.1 1 380
industry exp. overall 5,272 21,886.9 11,370.0 7 40,668
industry exp. in area 5,272 1,075.4 853.4 1 3,665
no. of wells 5,272 0.8 2.4 0 46
time trend 5,272 12.8 6.9 0 24
avg. group exp. 5,272 30.0 34.3 1.0 239.0
sum group exp. 5,272 105.0 131.3 2 1,361
auction knowledge 5,272 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
auction knowledge stock 5,272 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.01
no. of bids 5,272 2.7 1.3 2 15
bid st. dev. 5,272 1,190,978.0 4,153,939.0 30.4 143,464,820.0
bid ratio 5,272 0.5 0.3 0.01 1.0
bid range 5,272 2,247,220.0 7,537,530.0 43.0 202,889,894.0
Figure 4.1 presents a correlogram of the independent variables. The lower diagonal panel
consists of 95% confidence ellipses and a line of best fit. Long, thin ellipses indicate stronger
correlation compared to more circular ellipses. The area within the ellipse can be thought of
as containing 95% of the population. The pie charts in the upper panel indicate the degree
of correlation, where blue indicates positive and red indicates negative, respectively.
A histogram of the ratio of the second highest bid to the winning bid is presented in
Figure 4.2 and provides an indication of the distribution of the bid ratio. The histogram
suggests that ratio is evenly distributed. Figure 4.3 presents a histogram of the average
within-area experience for a collection of firms bidding on a specific tract. The bulk of the
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Figure 4.1: Correlogram of Independent Variables
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tracts were bid on by a collections of firms that were less experienced.
Figure 4.2: Histogram of Bid Ratio
4.2 Econometric Model
Measures of bid variation are regressed on measures of bidding experience among firms
competing for the same tract. The unit of observation is any tract that received at least
two bids in BOEM auction sales from 1984 - 2008. The coefficient on experience is expected
to be greater than zero, indicating diminishing dispersion of the distribution of the random
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of Average Within-Area Firm Experience
63
signal that firms are assumed to draw from, which provides an estimate of the value of the
development rights.





bid sdb,t,k = sd(bidsb,t,k) (4.2)
bid rangeb,t,k = max(bidb,t,k)−min(bidb,t,k) (4.3)
bid dispersionb,t,k = β0 + eb,t,kβe +Ob,t,kβO + ǫb,t,k, (4.4)
4.3 Results
The regression results presented in Table 4.2 - Table 4.5 are associated with the set of
regression specifications that employ the ratio of the second highest bid to the winning bid
as the dependent variable generate results that are inconsistent with initial expectations.
Average within-area experience does not affect the ratio of the second highest bid to the
winning bid. The sum of within-area bidder experience has a minute, statistically significant
effect on the bid ratio of -.0001, which is contrary to initial expectations. The standard
deviation of bids placed on each tract are positive in both the average and sum of within-
area bidder experience, which also contradicts initial expectations. The average within-area
experience coefficient estimate ranges between &7-✩8k and the coefficient estimate for the
sum of group experience ranges between ✩5,700 and ✩7,600. These results are puzzling. A
potential explanation is that tract performance and within-area experience are correlated.
Profit-maximizing firms will most likely choose to remain in areas that show promise. It is
likely the case that areas that acquire a reputation for being profitable will attract firms of
all different colors and bidding abilities. Perhaps it is the less equipped, less trained, and
less experienced firms seeking hot spots that submit less predictable bids. Firms that have
less ability in bidding will most likely submit bids with greater dispersion relative to that
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of the most successful oil firms for a variety of reasons. For instance, it is likely that firms
with less ability will rely on geological and geophysical data of less quality. Or if not less
quality raw data, then an inferior ability to map the data into relatively certain production
estimates. If this is in fact the case, then these firms would inevitably submit more disperse
bids on average, holding all else constant.
Table 4.2: Bid Ratio is Regressed on Average Firm Experience Within Area
Dependent variable:
Bid ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 0.57∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.13)
avg. group exp. −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
time trend −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
no. of bids 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
water depth −0.09 −0.14
(0.36) (0.37)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.3: Bid Ratio is Regressed on Average Firm Experience Within Area
Dependent variable:
Bid ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 0.57∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.10)
avg. group exp. −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
time trend −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
no. of bids 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
water depth −0.09 −0.14
(0.08) (0.09)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
Area Clustered Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.4: Bid Ratio Regressed on the Sum of Firm Experience Within Area
Dependent variable:
Bid Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 0.57∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.13)
sum. group exp. 0.0000 −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
time trend −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
no. of bids 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
water depth −0.09 −0.13
(0.36) (0.36)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
67
Table 4.5: Bid Ratio Regressed on the Sum of Firm Experience Within Area
Dependent variable:
Bid ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 0.57∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.10)
sum. group exp. 0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
time trend −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
no. of bids 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.01) (0.01)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
water depth −0.09 −0.13
(0.08) (0.09)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
Area Clustered Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Bid Standard Deviation Regressed on the Average Firm Experience Within Area.
Dependent variable:
Bid Standard Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 291,992.50 −1,331,176.00∗∗∗ −1,327,484.00∗∗∗ −506,499.90
(184,267.50) (266,115.20) (473,972.20) (1,085,623.00)
avg. group exp. 8,024.79∗∗∗ 8,941.15∗∗∗ 7,064.74∗∗ 7,013.06∗∗
(1,961.49) (1,931.85) (2,834.76) (3,028.26)
time trend 51,384.70∗∗∗ 40,491.78∗∗∗ 19,960.58 21,722.64
(12,292.53) (11,795.40) (13,441.86) (14,955.04)
no. of bids 637,403.70∗∗∗ 451,123.50∗∗∗ 446,345.70∗∗∗
(58,494.04) (49,037.98) (48,870.78)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 9.77 12.32
(16.31) (15.47)
water depth 71,973,413.00 72,587,219.00
(60,962,040.00) (61,296,574.00)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
69
Table 4.7: Bid Standard Deviation Regressed on the Average Firm Experience Within Area.
Dependent variable:
Bid Standard Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 291,992.50 −1,331,176.00∗∗ −1,327,484.00∗ −506,499.90
(312,137.10) (633,786.60) (756,285.90) (990,093.00)
avg. group exp. 8,024.79∗∗ 8,941.15∗∗ 7,064.74∗ 7,013.06
(3,857.54) (3,848.39) (4,088.68) (5,085.67)
time trend 51,384.70∗ 40,491.78∗ 19,960.58 21,722.64
(28,832.68) (23,649.14) (26,131.55) (27,631.76)
no. of bids 637,403.70∗∗∗ 451,123.50∗∗∗ 446,345.70∗∗∗
(158,535.20) (110,828.00) (110,932.30)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 9.77 12.32
(22.38) (21.09)
water depth 71,973,413.00∗∗∗ 72,587,219.00∗∗∗
(422,771.30) (666,451.40)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
Area Clustered Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Bid Standard Deviation Regressed on the Sum of Firm Experience Within Area
Dependent variable:
Bid Standard Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 215,917.20 −784,057.20∗∗∗ −617,346.00∗ 403,831.40
(183,143.60) (245,369.00) (367,155.10) (1,052,397.00)
sum. group exp. 7,505.79∗∗∗ 5,712.16∗∗∗ 6,803.24∗∗∗ 7,591.72∗∗∗
(677.72) (648.14) (976.96) (1,089.07)
time trend 14,621.09 21,335.57∗ 7,489.85 5,954.65
(11,838.22) (11,982.85) (13,173.70) (14,845.99)
no. of bids 404,938.30∗∗∗ 253,092.40∗∗∗ 228,028.00∗∗∗
(50,826.03) (47,975.39) (48,401.27)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 7.66 10.82
(17.26) (17.32)
water depth 71,681,891.00 72,163,582.00
(60,896,218.00) (61,214,548.00)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.9: Bid Standard Deviation Regressed on the Sum of Firm Experience Within Area
Dependent variable:
Bid Standard Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 215,917.20 −784,057.20 −617,346.00 403,831.40
(315,330.30) (480,425.80) (544,276.80) (906,372.70)
sum. group exp. 7,505.79∗∗∗ 5,712.16∗∗∗ 6,803.24∗∗∗ 7,591.72∗∗∗
(2,151.40) (1,944.82) (1,792.23) (2,231.15)
time trend 14,621.09 21,335.57 7,489.85 5,954.65
(20,558.29) (21,226.66) (23,483.19) (24,346.35)
no. of bids 404,938.30∗∗∗ 253,092.40∗∗∗ 228,028.00∗∗∗
(96,655.97) (74,991.43) (81,082.66)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 7.66 10.82
(22.90) (22.85)
water depth 71,681,891.00∗∗∗ 72,163,582.00∗∗∗
(292,676.50) (610,828.50)
Area Fixed Effect N N N Y
Area Clustered Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.4 Conclusion
The results derived in this analysis contradict expectations, but are consistent with other
analyses looking at bid dispersion and its determinants, Lohrenz et al. (1983). A potential
explanation for this was mentioned above in that tracts that are perceived as being more
attractive will lure firms in over time. Inferior firms looking to copy the big players will show
up and submit bids that are less thought out than those of their more experienced, wiser
competitors.
4.5 Final Comments
These analyses present weak evidence that firms, on average, improve their ability to bid
as they acquire an additional unit of within-area experience, and no discernible evidence that
experience overall affects a firms’ ability to bid. It would be comforting to find evidence that
the uncertainty faced by firms regarding the G&G characteristics of a tract is decreasing in
within-area experience. This finding would offer an explanation for the seeming improvement
in bidding performance in within-area experience. However, the findings generated from the
final analysis suggest that uncertainty regarding the G&G characteristics associated with
a plot does not decrease in collective, within-area experience, but rather increase, if G&G
uncertainty is measured by bid dispersion. A reasonable explanation for why this is observed
in the data is that firms are acquiring applicable knowledge of auction theory by consuming
print on the subject. In addition, the acquisition of within-area experience is likely to
result in less uncertainty regarding aspects of the auction environment that are relevant to
constructing bidding strategy. An example of this is the idea that firms gain familiarity
with aspects of the competition in terms of numbers and identities. Both of which could be
relevant to bidding strategy.
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Figure A.1: Real Rent and Firm Experience Overall
77
Figure A.2: Real Rent and Firm Experience Within Area
78
Figure A.3: Rent Return and Industry Experience Overall
79
Figure A.4: Rent Return and Industry Experience Within Area
80
Figure A.5: Real Rent and Industry Experience Overall
81
Figure A.6: Real Rent and Industry Experience Within Area
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Table A.1: Real Firm Rent Regressed on Firm and Industry Experience
Dependent variable:
Real Firm Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 681,983∗∗ 559,106∗∗ 438,487∗ −1,221,586∗∗∗ −956,720∗∗ 396,738
(274,309) (267,548) (259,077) (165,170) (419,734) (595,330)
firm exp. overall 12 −11 −475∗∗ 131 132 −2,345∗∗
(189) (191) (205) (126) (134) (1,003)
firm exp. in area 7,092∗∗ 7,083∗∗ 5,070∗ −274 −1,979 −1,741
(2,797) (2,798) (2,746) (1,682) (2,020) (2,101)
time trend −79,285∗∗∗ −197,629∗∗ −71,666 −126,478∗∗ −138,053∗∗ −166,667∗∗
(15,183) (88,526) (90,980) (60,014) (60,035) (72,454)
industry exp. overall 76 −17 66∗ 77∗∗ 163∗∗∗
(54) (57) (39) (39) (59)
water depth 313∗∗∗ 139∗∗∗ 154∗∗ 107
(34) (19) (68) (73)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 4,992∗∗∗ 4,988∗∗∗ 4,997∗∗∗
(528) (529) (530)
Area FE N N N N Y Y
Firm FE N N N N N Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.2: Rent Return Regressed on Firm and Industry Experience - Top 20
Dependent variable:
rent return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 9.607∗∗∗ 12.595∗∗∗ 10.169∗∗∗ −4.623∗∗∗ −7.066∗∗ −1.021
(2.186) (3.246) (2.825) (1.241) (3.054) (5.135)
firm exp. overall −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001 0.0001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
firm exp. in area 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.010 0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020)
time trend −0.576∗∗∗ 2.076 2.940∗ 1.273 1.162 1.209
(0.132) (1.395) (1.536) (0.897) (0.905) (0.912)
industry exp. overall −0.002∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
water depth 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.001)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Area FE N N N N Y Y
Firm FE N N N N N Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.3: Real Firm Rent Regressed on Firm and Industry Experience - Top 20
Dependent variable:
real firm rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 2,710,636∗∗∗ 2,783,264∗∗∗ 2,403,008∗∗∗ −818,793∗∗∗ −653,442 −270,441
(590,817) (582,674) (549,973) (309,033) (578,181) (680,603)
firm exp. overall −443∗ −437∗ −659∗∗ 205 199 −2,514∗
(262) (263) (270) (159) (181) (1,395)
firm exp. in area 7,494∗∗ 7,495∗∗ 6,175∗∗ −1,313 −2,445 −2,948
(2,950) (2,950) (2,898) (1,803) (2,504) (2,587)
time trend −166,475∗∗∗ −102,014 33,460 −329,780∗∗ −402,111∗∗∗ −358,281∗∗∗
(31,544) (184,111) (193,795) (133,603) (135,754) (135,379)
industry exp. overall −41 −143 171∗∗ 218∗∗∗ 301∗∗∗
(112) (120) (84) (84) (111)
max water depth 309∗∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 203∗∗ 164∗
(52) (30) (91) (97)
sum of disc. oil (000s barrels) 5,701∗∗∗ 5,699∗∗∗ 5,700∗∗∗
(709) (711) (709)
Area FE N N N N Y Y
Firm FE N N N N N Y
White Standard Errors
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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knowledge stock (millionths) 0.02∗∗∗
(0.004)
firm exp. overall −0.01∗∗
(0.003)













Residual Std. Error 71.30 (df = 26180)
F Statistic 37.58∗∗∗ (df = 447; 26180)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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auction theory knowledge 5,225∗∗∗
(681)
firm exp. overall −171
(196)




industry exp. in area −665∗∗∗
(103)
max water depth 108∗
(64)




Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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auction theory knowledge 0.0000
(0.0000)
firm exp. overall 0.0000
(0.0000)












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Ngram used as a proxy for auction theory knowledge consists of the accumulation of the

















Figure B.1: Standard Deviation of Bids and Auction Theory Knowledge
90
Figure B.2: Bid Range and Auction Theory Knowledge
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Figure C.1: Histogram of the Standard Deviation of Bids Per Tract.
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Figure C.2: Histogram of the Range of Bids Per Tract.
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Figure C.3: Histogram of the Sum of Firm Experience Within-Area
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